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DHRUV MADEKA
ABSTRACT. We present novel methods for predicting the outcome of
large elections. Our first algorithm uses a diffusion process to model the
time uncertainty inherent in polls taken with substantial calendar time
left to the election. Our second model uses Online Learning along with
a novel ex-ante scoring function to combine different forecasters along
with our first model. We evaluate different density based scoring func-
tions that can be used to better judge the efficacy of forecasters.
1. MOTIVATION
Models of the presidential election are many and varied, each with it’s
own focus. There is a vast literature on methods to forecast the presidential
elections. Models include those based on fundamental factors [5], Bayesian
methods [7], and prediction markets [4]. Other models including the popu-
lar FiveThirtyEight [15] combine multiple predictions through hybrid mod-
els which combine polls with other data. However, each of these methods
suffers the same flaw, they donot incorporate the time uncertainty of the
outcome. Using the same distribution at every point in time excludes the
fact that a measurement made with greater calendar time to the election has
more uncertainty than one made closer to the election (this is because, in
filtration terms, a large amount of uncertainty can still be realized).
Consider Figure [1], which shows the FiveThirtyEight probability time
series. They report a 90% probability in August, and a 55% probability in
October. If a forecaster truly believes that the probabilities move this much,
then he should report 50% 1 (A rigorous proof and better elucidation of this
can be seen in [16]). The greater the calendar time to the Election (or Event)
the greater time there is for uncertainty to be realized. The absence of this
time component of uncertainty renders the model unstable. We propose
a simple model, which utilizes a Brownian Motion with volatility. The
Brownian Motion is a continous time stochastic process whose variance
grows linearly with time. As a result, the greater the calendar time the
more the uncertainty in the final realization. Inspired by the seminal CAPM
1If we consider a GaussianN(µ, σ), and pick a level λ, as we increase the variance σ2,
the probability P(X ≥ λ)→ 0.5 as σ2 →∞
1
ar
X
iv
:1
70
4.
02
66
4v
2 
 [s
tat
.A
P]
  2
4 A
pr
 20
17
2 DHRUV MADEKA
FIGURE 1. FiveThirtyEight reported a 90% probability in
August, and a 55% in October.
Model in Finance, we propose a CAPM Model for the elections, treating
each of the 50 states as a stock and the national popular vote as the market.
Second, we address the notion of comparing forecasters. The conven-
tional method used, the Brier Score, fails to capture different aspects of
forecasts that distinguish a skilled forecaster from an unskilled one. We pro-
pose the use of two methods to compare forecasters according to the density
reported rather than just the probability. However, all of these comparisons
are ex-post, namely they rely on the realization of the event. Ideally, we
would like to be able to compare forecasters before the event so that we
may trade the prediction markets on the event. We use an ex-ante method to
compare forecasters in terms of a trading strategy, and then apply this com-
bination to the US Election Betting Market. Our online mixture performs
better than most experts.
2. PRELIMINARIES
2.1. Brownian Motion.
We work on a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F = (Ft)(0≤t≤T ),P). We
define a Brownian Motion W (ω)t in the following way:
Definition 1. Any continuous time stochastic process W (t) : t ≥ 0 is a
brownian motion if it has the following properties [6]:
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• For t1 ≤ t2 ≤ ... ≤ tn0
W (tn)−W (tn−1), ...,W (t2)−W (t1),W (t1)−W (t0)
are independent
• W (t) − W (s) is distributed N (0,√t− s) for 0 ≤ s < t; where
N (µ, σ) is the Normal Distribution with mean µ and variance σ2
• the process W (t) : t ≥ 0 has almost surely continuous paths
2.2. Proper Scoring Functions.
Following [12], consider (Ω,F ,F = (Ft)(0≤t≤T ),P), where P defines a
convex class of probability measures on Ω. A probabilistic forecast is any
probability measure P ∈ P. A scoring function is any extended real-valued
function S : P × Ω → R¯ such that S(P, .) is integrable for all P in P. We
define the expected score under Q as:
S(P,Q) =
∫
S(P, ω)dQ(ω)
A scoring function is said to be strictly proper relative to P if:
S(Q,Q) ≥ S(P,Q)
∀P,Q ∈ P. It is strictly proper if the equality holds if and only if P = Q.
2.3. Construction of Proper Scoring Functions.
We know, from [2], that a characterization of a Bregman Divergence is
that:
(1) argmax
Q∈G
E[−Df (P,Q)] = E[P |G]
But, for a scoring function, where the forecaster reports Q, and his true
probability measure is P, we have that:
argmax
Q∈P
E[S(1ω, Q)] = E[1ω|F ] = P
Hence, it is always optimal for a forecaster to report his true density
function P. Thus, a proper scoring function is equal to the negative of some
Bregman Divergence. But we know [3] that to construct a Bregman Diver-
gence, we only need to pick a strictly convex function f and write:
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S(P,Q) = f(p)− f(q)− 〈∇f(q), p− q〉
where∇f(q) denotes the sub-gradient of f at q.
3. MODELS
3.1. CAPM Model.
Our model follows the intuition of the Nobel prize winning Capital As-
set Pricing Model introduced by Treynor [17] [18] and Sharpe [14]. We
treat each state as a stock with the national popular vote playing the role of
the market. To calibrate this model, we consider over 1000 polls that are
obtained from RealClearPolitics and model each state’s popular vote as a
GAM with the single factor being the national polls. Once each state has
been calibrated, we treat the market as a continuous time stochastic process
which can take any number of values over the remaining period. Simulat-
ing from this model and for each state specific noise, we obtain a number
of possible scenarios for each state. The computation of the electoral votes
won by each candidate generates a winner for each scenario.
Consider an election with two candidate ci : i ∈ {1, 2}. At each time t
we denote the popular vote spread of candidate c1 in each state by Sit for i ∈
[1, 50] and denote by Mt the national popular vote spread (at t). For each
state, we assume that the spread follows the model:
(2) Sit = β
iφ(M it ) + 
i
where φ is some well-behaved function (in our case a non-parametric
regression).
Note, that unlike the traditional CAPM model, our equation is in levels
rather than returns. This is mainly done to avoid the noise created by multi-
ple polls which are very close to each other. We also make the assumption
that the βi in 2 does not depend on time, although a Kalman filter type
methodology could easily be used to incorporate this into the model. We
model the national popular vote in the following way:
(3) dMt = (σsamp + σM)dWt
where Wt denotes a canonical Brownian motion defined on the space
Ω ≡ C0([0, T ],R), where T denotes the time of the election. We further
assume that the white noise i ∼ N (0, σi).
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We use Ordinary Least Squares Regression to calibrate the βi for each
state and analyze the standard deviation of the residuals to obtain σi. The
data methodology is reviewed in Section 6. We use the standard deviation
of the national spread as our best estimate for σm. To forecast, we simulate
10000 paths of the brownian motion Wt and for each path we simulate 50
state specific noises i. Doing this allows us to obtain a popular vote esti-
mate for each state i in each simulation j ∈ [1,M ] which we denote by SijT .
Converting the popular vote in each state to an electoral vote enables us to
obtain a winner for each election.
We define the probability of winning each state (i) as:
Pc1i :=
M∑
j=1
1SijT >0.5
M
(for i ∈ [1, 50])
Denote by Elecj as the total number of electoral votes for candidate 1 in
simulation j. Thus Elecj : SjT → N and denote Pc1 as the probability of
candidate c1 winning the election, where:
(4) Pc1 :=
M∑
j=1
1Elecj≥270
M
The time series of probabilities can be seen in Figure 21. The simulations
can be seen in Figure 22.
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3.2. Bayesian Methods.
3.2.1. Robust Regression. For our first advanced model, we assume a sim-
ilar CAPM structure. However, we additionally postulate that:
αi ∼ N(αOLS, σα)
βi ∼ N(βOLS, σβ)
σi ∼ |N(0, σi)|
µi = αi + βiMT
SiT ∼ StudentT (µi, σi, ν = 3)
Where σα = 0.01 and σβ = 1.. Finally, we simulate MT as a Brown-
ian Motion, and draw from the predictive distribution of SiT for the state-
specific noise. An example of this can be seen in Figure 23. The simulations
can be seen in Figure 24.
FIGURE 2. Using the Bayes Ball Algorithm we can see that
each node is influenced by the others through the posterior
distribution of the shared hyperparameter.
3.2.2. Hierarchical Regression. A potential model, is to assume the Graph-
ical Structure in Figure 2.
We can sample our State Level noise from this model, and use the Bache-
lier Process to simulate the Market.
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4. EVALUATION OF FORECASTERS
The traditional way of evaluating a forecaster is the Brier Score. Which
is defined, for a realizations ωt and a sequence of probabilities pt as:
(5) Brier(T) =
T∑
t=1
(ωt − pt)2
The Brier Score is proper [12] and the lower the value the better. A
perfect forecaster would have a Brier Score of 0.
However, we consider a simple example, where two forecasters are asked
to give a probability an event o, whose true probability is 1
10
, will happen
every day. Forecaster A provides a constant probability of 0 while forecaster
B provides a constant probability of 1
4
. If both provide the same constant
probability for 100 time periods, Brier(A) = 1, while Brier(B) = 2.25. It is
not clear whether providing a zero probability for a low probability event
is optimal. Thus, we need better tail event behaviour. This motivates the
log-likelihood.
(6) Log Likelihood(T) =
T∑
t=1
log(ωtpt + (1− pt)(1− ωt))
As in 20, we see that the Log Likelihood goes parabolically to infinity at
the tails, while the Brier/Selten Scores become flat.
4.1. Density Comparison.
Both the Brier and the Selten score however provide an incomplete pic-
ture. Consider the US Election of 2016, where the two most publicized
forecasters were Nate Silver and Dr. Sam Wang. Nate Silver gave Hillary
Clinton a ( 70%) chance to win, while Dr. Wang gave her > 99.999%.
While the realization was 232 EV for Clinton, a question begs a subtle
response, what if Clinton had won in a Reagan-esque landslide (say with
≥ 489EV ), the Brier and Log Likelihood would say that Dr. Wang was the
better forecaster. However, a look at the histogram begs to differ:
We propose two methods to evaluate forecasters based on their histogram.
4.1.1. Selten Score.
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(A) Princeton Election Consortium
(B) FiveThirtyEight
FIGURE 3. The Histograms reveal that 538 had assigned
more probability to a Clinton Landslide than PEC.
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The first, the Selten Score 2 [13], is equivalent of taking the Brier Score
in each bin of the Histogram. We treat each bin independently. We know
from [11] that the maximum of a sum of functions is equivalent to the sum
of maximums. As a result, the Selten Score is proper.
For N bins in the Histogram, each assigned a probability pi, with a real-
ization ω ∈ i∗, we have:
Selten Score = 1−
N∑
i=1
(ωi − pi)2
= 2pi∗ −
N∑
i=1
p2i
We interpret this as a score that rewards assigning a high probability to
the correct bin (2p∗i ) and penalizes the forecaster for having too spread out
of a distribution (
∑N
i=1 p
2
i ).
4.1.2. CDF Score.
The Selten Score takes no account of the topology of the different bins.
In order to account for this topology, we propose to use a different scoring
function, which looks at the Brier Score above or below each level. The
Daily Kos methodology that uses Binomial Models as priors, lends itself
to producing spikes in the EV Histogram (see 12). Thus even though the
results are similar to the Princeton Election Consortium (see Figure 13), the
Selten 11 Score penalizes it as the topology of the bins is not factored into
the calculation. Two forecasters who gave the the entire probability mass
to a single bin (say 226 and 538) would have the same Selten score, even
though the result was 227 EV. We seek a scoring function that factors this
topology into account.
CDF Score(F, ω) =
∫
(F (x)− 1x≥ω)2dx
A proof for the propriety of this scoring function is given in Appendix A.
The results for each model on each scoring function is given in Appen-
dix C.
2Named after Nobel Laureate Reinhard Selten. Though it was inspired by his argument
for the singularity of the Brier Score, we could not find a reference which uses the Brier
Score in this way.
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4.1.3. Comparison of Different Scoring Functions. As seen in Figure 20,
the behaviour of diffferent scoring functions becomes very important in the
tails. While the Selten/Spherical/Brier become flat, the log moves paraboli-
cally to−∞, which makes it hypersensitive to low probability events, while
the Selten/Spherical/Brier are undersensitive. Once again, we see the bene-
fit of the CDF Score, as it moves linearly to −∞.
5. TRADING SCORE AND ONLINE LEARNING
All of the forecasts given above are ex-post forecasts, i.e., they require
the realization of an event. However, in many cases, such as Election Mod-
elling, we would like to judge the efficacy of forecasters before the realiza-
tion of the event so that we may combine them to create an optimal mixture
of forecasts.
For this purpose, we propose the trading score. Consider 2 forecasters
predicting a binary event, we assume each posts a time series of forecasts
at and bt respectively. Assume each day each forecasters take a position
that is proportional to their distance from a reference level st. This can
be the betting market (see Appendix C for results) or the average of the 2
forecasters. Given that each forecaster takes a position everyday (bought
at the betting market or at the average), we can re-evaluate the value of
this position everyday and treat the cumulative P&L as an online scoring
function. Finally, on a realization of an event, we either settle at the betting
market (which converges to the 0 or 1) or at the realization of (0 or 1). See
Appendix B for a proof.
Using the trading score, with the betting market as a reference, we em-
ploy the weighted majority algorithm, with the trading score and the qua-
dratic loss (brier score) as the Loss function in each case. At each date, we
take a position relative to our prediction and then backtest this position over
all available time periods. Finally, we look at the entire profit and loss of
the algorithm that buys and sells the betting market as its predicted price.
For N experts, our weights are initialized w0,i = 1N , for i ∈ [1, N ], and
updated as follows:
wt+1 ← wte−ηL(yˆt,i,yt)
with the prediction at each round being:
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yˆt =
N∑
i=1
wt,iyt,i
N∑
i=1
wt,i
where L denotes the cumulative loss of each expert. [9] derive a bound
on the Regret upto time T and show that for
η =
√
8 logN
T
=⇒ Regret (T ) ≤
√
T
2
logN
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6. DATA METHODOLOGY FOR THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
The data for both the national and state polls is obtained from RealClear-
Politics. The for each polls consists of the following attributes:
• Name of the Pollster
• State (= US for National Polls)
• Sample Size
• Sample Type ∈ [Registered Voters, Likely Voters, All]
• Trump %
• Clinton %
• Johnson %
• Stein %
Using this data, we assume WLOG that c1 = Clinton % and proceed to
use Sit = Clinton
i
t−Trumpit% as the primary variable to model. We choose
to model only the Democratic and Republican candidate as the leading in-
dependent Gary Johnson shows his highest poll % in a New Mexico poll
conducted by the Albuquerque Journal [1], where Clinton still leads by 11
%. Though it should be noted here that Johnson winning New Mexico can
create many more scenarios of an electoral deadlock, in which case the state
popular vote is no longer an accurate way to forecast the winner of the elec-
tion. A more detailed methodology would allow for a fat tail where this is
possible.
6.1. Missing States. Numerous states are either not featured in the poll
database or contain fewer than 4 points, making any inference with them
extremely dubious.
The following states lacked sufficient data to do any analysis:
• Alabama
• Alaska
• Hawaii
• Kentucky
• Montana
• Nebraska
• North Dakota
• Oklahoma
• South Dakota
• Tennessee
• West Virginia
• Wyoming
• Washington
D.C.
As a result, to compound the data we used the state’s popular vote spread
for the party associated with candidate c1 in each election going back to
1976 along with the national popular vote spread for that year.
6.2. Asynchronity in State and National Polls. As a result of sparse data
in each state, there may not be state and national polls available in each time
period, or alternately there may be multiple national polls within the same
period. To deal with this we calibrate a non-parametric regression with a
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Gaussian Kernel to the national poll. The chosen bandwidth is 5.0, which
is determined empirically.
This methodology may be criticized for its naivety. And in fact, most
other public methodologies [15] weight each poll by some measure of it’s
quality. However, a recent paper [10] surveys the long history of aggregat-
ing polls and questions whether weighting by accuracy measures is relevant
when the error arises from multiple sources (not just sampling error). The
paper posits that it may be just as, if not more, appropriate to aggregate
using a simple weighted average.
FIGURE 4. Plot of the non-parametric regression for the
Clinton (Candidate C1) Spread. The dots represent the ac-
tual polls, while the line represents the smoothed aggrega-
tion used.
6.3. Modeller Data. In order to compile the experts, we scraped the fore-
casts made publicly available for the following forecasters:
• FiveThirtyEight (Now/Plus/Polls’
Models)
• Huffington Post
• New York Times
• Princeton Election Consor-
tium
• Daily Kos
Additionally, we use the CAPM and Option Market Models we have cre-
ated as our 5th and 6th experts. We use the data provided by [8].
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7. RESULTS
As we see in Figure 5, the CAPM and the Online Learning Model per-
formed better than everyone except the FiveThirtyEight, the Betting Mar-
ket, the CAPM and the Option Market Model. The additional noise in the
CAPM Model aslo helped it perform very well. In a state average, we see
that predicting OH, FL, IA, NC and AZ correctly from early on made the
CAPM perform very well. An Electoral Vote weighted average shows that
the CAPM performed best.3
FInally, the log damages the Princeton Election Consortium as they re-
ported 100% probabilities for Clinton winning. The same applies for Daily
Kos in the State-wise and EV weighted averages.
We see the flaw in the Selten Score 11 as the DK Histogram in Figure
12 has spikes as an artifact of the modelling technique, which the Selten
ignores. The CDF Score 14 on the other hand shows that the two are really
comparable.
The Online Learning Algorithm performs very well, 16 but is unable to
overcome the fact that most experts were sure about Clinton and there was
a strong discontinuity in the betting market towards the end. In terms of
Scoring Functions, it performed much better than most algorithms, and was
comparable to the CAPM Model.
The trading score performed much better than a conventional quadratic
score (see Figure 18) but was more bullish than the quadratic score (see
Figure 17). As a result, the final P&L was slightly worse. The MSE (see
Figure 19) for predicting the betting market was lower for the Online Algo-
rithms than for any modeller except 538 4 We once again see that there are
some issues to be sorted out, while the trading score does solve the ex-ante,
ex-post problem, it does not provide a good reference when no market is
available. Martingality of prices by the No-Arbitrage Theorems imply that
the average is not a good reference5
The option methodology does not have a clean way to select securities.
Trump’s rhetoric allowed us to interpret the USDMXN peso correctly, but
there exists no clean way to select securities. This would be an ideal task
for further machine learning research.
3It is not clear that advanced Bayesian methods are helpful here. The probabilities
provided by the Student T regression as well as the Hierarchical Model were very similar
to the CAPM Model. If we study the histogram in Figure 24, it is not clear that fat-tailed
distributions are relevant here, unless we believe there are non-trivial probabilities of a
landslide.
4As a footnote, its not clear that the betting markets, like all of us are not just following
538.
5Since by linearity of expectation, taking an equally weighted average should be ideal,
and by the Martingale property the best guess of the future value is the current value.
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Finally, to improve the Online Learning Algorithms, better scoring func-
tions are needed. The CDF score seems like a great candidate, though data
for experts is very hard to get. We hope that this paper will motivate the
use of density scoring versus simple Brier or Log-Likelihood Scoring. Cur-
rently very few forecasters report the density and fewer keep a catalogue
of it. Providing this data will allow for a better aggregation of the different
forecasters, and better model building.
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APPENDIX A. CDF SCORE IS PROPER
Consider a forecaster, whose true measure is P and who reports Q.Then
his expected score is:
S(P,Q) = EP
[ ∞∫
−∞
(Q(y)− 1y≥x)2dy
]
= EP
[ ∞∫
−∞
Q2(y)dy
]
− 2
∞∫
−∞
Q(y)EP[1y≥x]dy +
∞∫
−∞
EP[1y≥x]dy
=
∞∫
−∞
Q2(y)dy − 2
∞∫
−∞
Q(y)P (y)dy +
∞∫
−∞
P (y)dy
Differentiating with respect to Q and setting the derivative = 0, and as-
suming regularity conditions on the densities, we get:
∂S(P,Q)
∂Q
= 2
∞∫
−∞
Q(y)dy − 2
∞∫
−∞
P (y)dy
=⇒
∞∫
−∞
P (y)dy =
∞∫
−∞
Q(y)dy
=⇒ P (y) = Q(y) almost everywhere
Now, we consider a Cramer type of divergence function:
d(P,Q) =
∞∫
−∞
(P (y)−Q(y))2dy
(7) argmax
Q
EP
[ ∞∫
−∞
(P(y)−Q(y))2dy
]
= EP
[
P]
which shows that the CDF score is proper.
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APPENDIX B. THE TRADING SCORE IS PROPER
Consider, a two date one period model. The position at time t is (at− bt),
which is bought at a price at+bt
2
. At time T, we settle at the realization,
which gives us
S(a0, T ) = EP[PNL(a0, T )] = EP[−1ω(a0 − b0) + a
2
0 + b
2
0
2
]
=⇒ ∂S
∂a0
= EP[−1ω + a0]
=⇒ argmax
a0
PNL(a0, T ) = EP[1ω]
Hence, the profit and loss of this trading score corresponds to a strictly
proper scoring function. A simple induction argument proves this for N time
periods. For the position take at period T − 1, we consider maximizing the
profit and loss.
S(aT−1, T ) = EP[PNL(aT−1, T )] = EP
[
−1ω(aT−1 − bT−1) + a
2
T−1 + b
2
T−1
2
|FT
]
+
PNL(a0<t<T−1, T )EP[1ω|FT ]
=⇒ ∂S
∂aT−1
= EP[−1ω + aT−1|FT ]
=⇒ argmax
aT−1
PNL(aT−1, T ) = EP[1ω|FT ]
Now, we can do the same for aT−2, settingE[aT−1|FT−2] = EP[EP[1ω|FT ]|FT−2] =
EP[1ω|FT−2], by the tower property of the conditional expectation [9].
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APPENDIX C. RESULTS OF MODELS
FIGURE 5. In the overall Brier we see that the Online Model
performed better than all the bullish models.
FIGURE 6. The CAPM Model did better than all models
except the FiveThirtyEight Polls Plus Model.
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FIGURE 7. The CAPM Model correctly predicted OH, FL,
IA, NC from very early on, which allowed better scores than
FiveThirtyEight when weighted by EV, making it the best
EV weighted model.
FIGURE 8. Princeton Election Consortium and HuffPost
were heavily penalized for reporting probabilities close to
100%, due to the hypersensitivity of the log [13].
APPENDIX D. BEHAVIOUR OF DIFFERENT SCORING FUNCTIONS
20 DHRUV MADEKA
FIGURE 9. Daily Kos was very sure about MI, PA, WI,
causing a massive loss.
FIGURE 10. EV Weighted Log Likelihood Score: Daily
Kos was very sure about MI, PA, WI, causing a massive loss.
APPENDIX E. SIMULATION RESULTS
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FIGURE 11. The DK and the PEC histograms were very
narrow. Here we see the flaw of the Selten, as DK’s logit
model created spikes in the Histogram close to 232 that are
not accounted for, giving it the lowest Selten Score
FIGURE 12. The DK and PEC histogram are very similar in
terms of variance, but the methodology of DK lends itself to
spikes at different EV’s. The Selten unduly penalizes this as
there is no topology induced amongst the different bins.
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FIGURE 13. The DK and PEC histogram are very similar
in terms of variance, but the methodology of DK lends itself
to spikes at different EV’s. The Selten unduly penalizes this
as there is no topology induced amongst the different bins.
Figure 14 shows that they are actually very similar.
FIGURE 14. The flaws of the Selten are corrected by the
CDF Score, which shows that DK and PEC were very close
in terms of a distributional score.
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FIGURE 15. Time Series of Modellers, we see that the on-
line learning Algorithm (magenta) picks up the drop in Clin-
ton quite quickly.
FIGURE 16. Despite being net long, the online learning al-
gorithm (magenta) does not end up with the worst loss.
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FIGURE 17. As we see, the Quadratic Score has a higher
profit and loss.
FIGURE 18. However, if we exclude the final result, trading
with the trading score would have generated a higher P&L.
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FIGURE 19. As we see, the Online Quadratic Model and the
Online Trading Score had similar performance losing only to
538 in predicting the betting market.
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FIGURE 20. Plot of the different scoring functions with the
x-axis representing the realization and the y-axis represent-
ing the Score. The distributions used are Gaussians with dif-
ferent means and standard deviations. As we see, the Selten
and Spherical are flat at the tail, while the log goes paraboli-
cally to −∞, while the CDF score goes linearly to −∞.
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FIGURE 21. Each line shows the time series of probabilities
for each state.
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FIGURE 22. Plot of the map for representing the probabili-
ties for each state, red implies republican and blue democrat.
The histogram has the number of simulations on the y axis
and the Electoral Votes won on the X-axis.
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FIGURE 23. Here we see the samples drawn from the pre-
dictive distribution of the α’s and β’s. We use each one to
generate a noise about the state.
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FIGURE 24. Plot of the map for representing the probabili-
ties for each state, red implies republican and blue democrat.
The histogram has the number of simulations on the y axis
and the Electoral Votes won on the X-axis. As we see the
Student T distribution gives a very similar probability with
fatter tails for Trump.
